Opinion · family law
Signing at a moment of crisis: when giving up half a home is in fact a property agreement
A couple married for many years. The apartment in which they live is registered in both names, half each. Then a crisis comes, and one spouse sets a condition: if they are to carry on together, the other must sign that the apartment passes to him or her. The signature is given, and the life together continues. Years later the couple divorce, and then the document is produced.
The question sounds technical, but it decides the fate of the only asset of many families: is such a document valid when no judge has approved it? I believe it is not. In this article I explain why, and I also address the arguments for the opposite view.
The Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 5733-1973, defines a property agreement as “an agreement between spouses regulating the property relations between them” (section 1).1 Under section 2(a), “a property agreement requires the approval of the Family Court”, or of the religious court. Section 2(b) adds that approval will be given only after the judge or dayan is satisfied “that the spouses made the agreement… of their free will and understanding its meaning and consequences”.
On the other hand, section 5(a)(3) excludes from the equalisation of resources “assets that the spouses agreed in writing would not be equalised between them”. In HCJ Gamliel it was held that such an agreement does not need approval, even where the asset is a residential apartment.2
So where does the line fall? When is a document between spouses an “agreement about an asset” that needs no approval, and when is it a property agreement for all purposes? The Supreme Court has already described this as an “interesting and captivating legal question”, but has not decided it to the end.3
In my view the answer lies in a long-established rule, from the judgment in Sharabi:
“In our opinion, it is not the generality of the agreement, or the fact that it relates (for example) to a single asset among many, that is the decisive test, but its relation to the property relations between the spouses in the event of the termination of the marriage.” CA 169/83 Sharabi v. Sharabi, IsrSC 39(3) 7764
And in the same judgment: “The test whether a given agreement between spouses is a ‘property agreement’ or not lies in its purpose”.
That is, it does not matter whether the document is called an “affidavit”, a “gift” or a “transfer without consideration”. It does not matter whether it deals with one asset or with all the property. If its purpose is to determine what will happen to the property when the marriage ends, it is a property agreement. And a property agreement requires approval.
A document signed on the condition that “we will continue together”, whose whole purpose is to determine who will receive the apartment if the marriage does not hold, is exactly such an agreement. This is not a transaction between two strangers. It is a property arrangement that anticipates divorce.
Here there is a distinction that is easy to miss. Section 5(a)(3) deals with the equalisation of resources, that is, the financial calculation made at the end of the marriage. It allows spouses to agree: “we will leave this asset out of the account”.
The transfer of a registered half of an apartment from one spouse to the other is something else. It does not take an asset out of the account. It takes a right of ownership that already belongs to one spouse, and transfers it to the other without consideration.
The law is built in layers. Section 3(a) provides that only if the spouses “did not make… a property agreement” (or to the extent that the agreement provides otherwise) does the equalisation arrangement apply. One first checks whether there is a property agreement, and only then reaches equalisation. For that reason, in my view, a provision that deals with equalisation cannot circumvent the approval requirement in section 2.
The Gamliel rule, too, was born in different circumstances: an apartment bought mainly with the money of one side and his family, and registered in both spouses’ names for mortgage purposes. That is very different from a situation in which the apartment belonged to both from the outset, and the waiver was made under the pressure of a crisis.
The law in Israel has been clear for almost fifty years:
“Abandonment of the home or adultery may create a rift between the spouses and in this way put an end to sharing, but one is not punished for them retroactively by the taking of rights in the joint property.” CA 264/77 Dror v. Dror, IsrSC 32(1) 8295
If a document signed in the wake of adultery, without approval, can transfer half an apartment, we have opened a back door. What a court would never decide can be achieved by a single signature in a moment of guilt and fear.
This is precisely the purpose of the approval requirement. In Nefisi ( see an analysis of the rule in the journal Mishpatim ) Justice A. Goldberg wrote that “the prejudicial nature of such an agreement is what raises the concern that there was a defect in the will of the spouse who was prejudiced”.6 Giving up half of the home, in exchange for a promise that the marriage will continue, is a clear example of a prejudicial agreement.
The Supreme Court has also warned against the use of property as a means of pressure. In Yaakobi it was held that a desirable property arrangement “does not give one of the spouses an opportunity to exploit the property arrangements in order to impose his will on his spouse and subject him or her to his terms”.7
Where there is no approval, who must prove what? Some will say that the one who gave up must prove that pressure was applied. In my view that is precisely the mistake.
The approval requirement exists to spare the weaker spouse the need to prove after the event that pressure was applied. It is a condition of the agreement’s validity, not a ground for setting it aside. Therefore, if such an agreement is examined on its merits at all, it is the one who seeks to enjoy the waiver who must prove that it was given freely and with understanding.
The same is true in comparative law. In California, the Family Code imposes on spouses a fiduciary duty toward one another.8 Where a transaction between spouses benefits one of them, a presumption of undue influence arises, and the burden of rebutting it lies on the one who gained. In Haines the courts applied the presumption to a woman who gave up her share in the home in favour of her husband.9
Another argument that recurs in such cases: “Why did you not ask to cancel at once? Years have passed.” Section 20 of the Contracts Law (General Part) does provide that a person who signed under duress must give notice of cancellation within a reasonable time after the duress ended.
But when does duress that originates in the marriage itself end? Not on the day of signing. As long as the spouses live together and try to rebuild the home, one cannot expect the person who gave up to sue his or her spouse. The pressure continues as long as the life together continues, and the clock starts ticking only when it ends.
To be fair, one must also face the arguments for the opposite view. And it must be said honestly: some courts have accepted them.
Autonomy. Spouses are adults. They may give each other gifts, and not every act between them needs supervision. That is true, but the legislature chose expressly to supervise one area: property arrangements that anticipate dissolution. Precisely because within a marriage the balance of power is complex and emotions run high.
The signing was done before a lawyer. That sounds reassuring, but a lawyer brought by one of the parties is not a court. The law allows verification by a notary only for an agreement “made before the marriage” (section 2(c1)). Within the marriage the legislature required review by a judge or dayan.
The Gamliel rule permits it. It permits taking an asset out of the equalisation, and that is indeed permitted. But as I have explained, taking an asset out of the equalisation is not a transfer of ownership, and the circumstances there were different.
Years have passed. Time itself does not make an unapproved property agreement valid. And if what is involved is duress at all, the clock starts only when the life together ends.
Considering transferring property to your spouse? Do it the right way. An agreement approved by a court or a rabbinical court will stand. A document without approval may not.
Being asked to sign at a moment of crisis? Do not sign before you have received independent legal advice, from your own lawyer and not the other side’s.
Have you already signed? That is not the last word. It is worth checking whether the document is in fact an unapproved property agreement.
Are you the side who received? Do not assume that the apartment is already yours. A document without approval may turn out to be without effect precisely when you need it most.
In summary
The approval requirement in the Spouses (Property Relations) Law is not bureaucracy. It is the protection that the legislature gave the spouse at the moment when he or she is most vulnerable. If we allow it to be circumvented by means of a “transfer without consideration”, we will empty it of content in exactly the cases for which it was written.
Sources
- Spouses (Property Relations) Law, 5733-1973, sections 1, 2, 3(a), 5(a)(3) (full text) (in Hebrew).
- HCJ 10605/02 Gamliel v. Great Rabbinical Court, IsrSC 58(2) 529 (2003). The rule is cited in Family Appeal Permission 7468/11 (Supreme Court, 2012).
- Family Appeal Permission 7734/08 Anonymous v. Anonymous.
- CA 169/83 Sharabi v. Sharabi, IsrSC 39(3) 776, 781–782 (1985). Cited in a judgment of the Great Rabbinical Court (2019) and in a report on N12.
- CA 264/77 Dror v. Dror, IsrSC 32(1) 829, 832 (1978).
- FH 1558/94 Nefisi v. Nefisi, IsrSC 50(3) 573 (1996). An analysis article in the journal Mishpatim, the Hebrew University (in Hebrew).
- CA 1915/91 Yaakobi v. Yaakobi, IsrSC 49(3) 529 (1995).
- Cal. Fam. Code §721 ; In re Marriage of Bonds, 24 Cal.4th 1 (2000).
- In re Marriage of Haines, 33 Cal.App.4th 277 (1995) (full text).
- Contracts Law (General Part), 5733-1973, section 20.
The information in this article is general and is not legal advice. Each case is examined on its own merits. Quotations from statutes and judgments are the office’s own translation from the Hebrew.